By Maj. William Carraway
Historian, Georgia Army National Guard
A World War II Collar Disc of the 121st Infantry Regiment with maps of Brittany, France |
Patton
Unleashed
On July
31st, 1944, the 121st Infantry Regiment entered corps reserve at LaHay Pesnel,
a small French town approximately five miles north of Avranches. While the
121st and the 8th Infantry Division got some badly needed rest, Lt. Gen. George
S. Patton’s 3rd Army, freshly arrived on the Contentin Peninsula was unleashed
upon Brittany. Patton dispatched the 4th Armored Division, his old command from
pre-war stateside service due south from the vicinity of the 121st assembly
area near Avranches to the vital road and railroad hub of Rennes. The 4th AD
then proceeded south to take Nantes on the Loire River approximately 20 miles
east of the German held coastal town of St. Nazaire. Having reached Nantes on
August 12, the 4th AD had traveled 90 miles and effectively sealed off
Britanny. The Germans still in place in coastal port cities of St. Malo, Dinard
and Brest were cut off from reinforcements.
Meanwhile,
the 6th AD was charged with taking the fortified coastal port of Brest which
had served as a major port of entry for U.S. forces in World War I. Pattton met
with Maj. Gen. Robert Grow, commanding 6th AD and informed him that he had made
a wager with General Bernard Montgomery, commanding 2nd Army, that Patton’s
forces could reach Brest in five days.[i]
An outside
observer considering Patton’s bold order to “take Brest” may have found the
tasking impossible when judged against the slow steady advance that had defined
the Normandy Campaign. Nevertheless, Patton reasoned that as an exploiting
operation, his forces would have much greater impact the faster they traveled.
In terms of basic physics, Patton was going to move his armored forces at great
speed in order to land with resounding force upon the fortress city and deprive
the Germans of the ability to reinforce.[ii]
It was hoped that the combination of lightning maneuver and audacity would
cause the capitulation of the city and its valuable port facilities. The Allies
were in desperate need of a port to admit the supplies needed to sustain the
advance. The port of Cherbourg on the Contentin peninsula had been destroyed by
the German defenders and it would be months before its facilities could be
repaired.
The 6th AD
started their advance on August 3, its three combat commands moving parallel
along separate routes. In a virtuoso performance of maneuver and bypass, the
6th AD drove west avoiding the German strongholds of St. Malo and Dinard in
their drive for the coast of France. Follow-on forces would reduce these enemy
strongholds and prevent them from gaining the rear of the 6th AD’s advance.
The 6th AD reached the outskirts of Brest the evening of August 6; however, Crow had no intelligence as to the preparation, array of forces of plan of the German defense that lay ahead of him. Artillery fire from Brest confirmed that he did not possess the element of surprise. Crow attempted to bluff the Germans into surrender and probed Brest’s outer defenses without success.[iii] Realizing that the 6th AD would require additional combat power, Patton ordered the 8th Division to dispatch a battalion to Brest.[iv] The battalion departed August 8, while the rest of the 8th Division prepared for movement into Brittany.
John Taggart of Cordele, Ga. was killed August 13, 1944 while fighting with Company L, 121st Infantry. Georgia Archives |
The Gray
Bonnets Advance
While the
6th AD was probing the lines at Brest, the 121st Infantry Regiment had moved to
the vicinity of vil de Bourg.[vi]
The regiment was temporarily transferred to the 83rd Division which was part of
the follow-on effort to reduce St. Malo. The efforts of the 83rd had been
delayed by heavy artillery positions in Dinard which could range the American
Forces with plunging, flanking fire. The 121st would move to reduce Dinard and
eliminate the heavy artillery threat to forces assaulting St. Malo.[vii]
Soldiers of the 121st Infantry Regiment rest on the march to Dinard. Georgia Guard Archives |
At 7:00 on
the morning August 8, The 2nd and 3rd Battalions assaulted defensive positions
but made little progress due to German machine gunners and snipers hidden in
French barns and homes. Artillery trained on one of these houses and blasted it
only to discover that the house was a façade for a concrete pill box. Round
after round of 105 mm ordnance and the efforts of engineers failed to clear the
obstacles on the 2nd Battalion front.
With the 2nd
Battalion stuck fast the 3rd Battalion maneuvered into an opening in German
lines, paralleled a set of railroad tracks and struck north to the vicinity of
Pleurtit. The 3rd Battalion was comprised of units with long histories in South
Georgia. Company I carried on the tradition of the Baldwin Blues, which was
organized in Milledgeville in 1810. Battalion Headquarters and Company K were
based in Dublin. The Cordele Rifles of Company L and the Hawkinsville-based
Company M rounded out the battalion.[viii]
The
following evening, German forces slipped behind 3rd Battalion. Surrounded, and
unable to move, the 3rd Battalion was subject to an unrelenting barrage of
infantry fire which pinned them to the ground and prevented them from
maneuvering. Worse, exploding shells had severed the lines of communication
between the 3rd Battalion and the regiment. Nevertheless, Col. Jeter, commander of
the 121st Infantry Regiment was able to discern the fate of the battalion from
unanswered communication and swiftly ordered 1st and 2nd Battalions to move to
support the “Lost Battalion.”
Before its
sister battalions could begin movement the 3rd Battalion was subject to intense
ground assault by armored and infantry forces. Beginning on the morning of
August 9, German attacks were launched in all directions. A direct hit on the
battalion command post killed the operations officer and motor transportation officer.
Shortly thereafter, a German tank emerged from cover and opened fire from a
distance of 500 yards killing several Soldiers. Pvt. Francis Gardiner, a
bespectacled Soldier of Headquarters Company went into swift action firing a 57
mm gun. The second round fired by Gardiner struck the turret killing the crew.[ix]
Similar
engagements occurred throughout the defense zone of the 3rd Battalion with
casualties mounting steadily. Medics established a makeshift hospital in a
French farmhouse that became known as the Purple Heart Hotel.[x]
Pfc. John Dewitt Jones of Cordele, Ga. was killed August 13, 1944 while fighting with Company L, 121st Infantry. Georgia Archives |
Elements of
the 83rd Division eventually made contact with the 3rd Battalion on the
afternoon of August 12. The Lost Battalion had been cut off from its regiment
for nearly four days and endured repeated assaults and constant artillery
bombardment but held the line.
TSgt. John Hamlin of Company A, 121st was killed August 14, 1944. Georgia Guard Archives |
By the
evening of August 14, Dinard was in Allied hands though snipers and pockets of
resistance still inflicted casualties. The next day the 121st loaded up into
trucks for transportation to their next objective: The fortress of Brest.
The
narrative will rejoin the 6th AD and 121st at Brest, but first, the 179th and
945th Field Artillery Battalions will arrive on Omaha Beach and will enter the
fray.
[i] Blumenson, Martin. Breakout and Pursuit. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army,
1984, 370.
[ii]
Ibid.
[iii]
Blumenson, 382
[iv]
Blumenson, 384
[v]
Blumenson, 387
[vi] 121st
Infantry Regiment. The Gray Bonnet;
Combat History of the 121st Infantry Regiment. Baton Rouge, LA: Army &
Navy Publishing Co., 1946, 33
[vii]
Ibid.
[viii]
Carraway, William. "The Georgia Guard on the Eve of War: May 1939."
May 23, 2019.
http://www.georgiaguardhistory.com/2019/05/the-georgia-guard-on-eve-of-war-may-1939.html.
[ix]
121, 34.
[x]
121, 35.
[xi]
121, 36.