By Maj. William Carraway
Historian, Georgia Army National Guard
Federal Soldiers maneuver near Chattanooga during the 150th anniversary reenactment of the Battle of Chickamauga. Photo by Capt. William Carraway
Situation
in the West
Where May
1863 saw the apogee of Confederate hopes with an improbable victory at Chancellorsville,
July represented a stunning reversal and a resurgence of Northern fortunes. In
addition to General Robert E. Lee’s defeat at Gettysburg, Federal forces under
Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant had forced the capitulation of Vicksburg,
Mississippi effectively dividing the Confederacy in two.
Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans |
Meanwhile,
in Tennessee, Federal Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans was about to achieve a
strategic victory of maneuver against his old foe Confederate Maj. Gen. Braxton
Bragg and his Army of Tennessee. In January, Rosecrans had fought Bragg to a
standstill in Murfreesboro, Tenn., and forced the southern army to retreat to
Tullahoma.[1]
Remaining in Murfreesboro for six months, Rosecrans rebuilt his army before
launching his Tullahoma Campaign to drive Bragg from his strong defensive
positions. In early July, Rosecrans sent his three army corps on separate
routes of march flanking Bragg from his lines and forcing him to retreat to Chattanooga.
The campaign was nearly bloodless and a brilliant study in maneuver. But
Rosecrans was set on driving Bragg completely out of Tennessee. To that end, he
set his sights on Chattanooga, a vital rail hub key to the launching of
operations into the deep south.
Approaches to Chattanooga
Anyone who
has driven north through Monteagle, Tenn. is familiar with the Cumberland
Plateau. It rises sharply, dividing Chattanooga from the rich farmland of
middle Tennessee. This terrain feature provided Rosecrans with a significant
challenge. He would have to cross the plateau with an army and all its supply
wagons. Moreover, once across the plateau, he would be vulnerable to attack
from Bragg who could isolate his elements and attack them with their backs to
the mountain removing any avenue of escape. To compound his problem, Rosecrans
would then have to cross the Tennessee River to approach the defensible city of
Chattanooga.
Nashville, Chattanooga, And St. Louis Railway. Map of Chickamauga & Chattanooga National Park. LOC |
To cross the river, Rosecrans employed clever subterfuge. Sending his three corps to the west and southwest of Chattanooga, Rosecrans dispatched a diversion force of four brigades to demonstrate north of the city. While the bulk of his forces moved west screened by mountains the diversion force shelled Chattanooga by day and by night lit dozens of campfires to lend the appearance of vast numbers of encamped Soldiers. The plan worked. By early September, Rosecrans had crossed downstream and to the rear of Chattanooga.[2] Through deception, Rosecrans had brought his Army within striking distance of Chattanooga, traversing both mountain and river utterly uncontested. As with Tullahoma, Bragg found himself outmaneuvered with the enemy threatening his communications and his route of escape.
Cannons guard the formidable approaches to Chattanooga. Photo by Capt. William Carraway |
Bragg Retreats
Alarmed by
the developments and hoping to reverse the setbacks of the summer of 1863, Confederate
President Jefferson Davis dispatched two divisions from Mississippi under Maj.
Gen. John Breckenridge, a former United States vice president[3],
and two divisions from the Army of Northern Virginia under command of Lt. Gen.
James Longstreet[4] to
bolster Bragg’s ranks. These reinforcements would prove critical to the battle
of Chickamauga, but for now, Bragg was on his own. Abandoning Chattanooga,
Bragg retreated to the vicinity of Lafayette, Ga. Rosecrans, exultant at the
victory, began pursuit. Compelled by Washington telegraphs to pursue Bragg,
Rosecrans divided his army and plunged into Georgia with 60,000 men moving
along three separate avenues of approach. Nearly 6,000 would not return.
Civilian
reports confirmed Rosecrans’ suspicions that Bragg was making a disorganized
retreat. Crestfallen deserters confirmed the observations and convinced Rosecrans
that he was moving into terrain devoid of effective enemy resistance. Ignoring
the advice of Maj. Gen. George Thomas, who commanded Rosecrans’ XIV Corps,
Rosecrans did not pause to consolidate and reinforce Chattanooga. Instead he
dispatched his army along diverse routes with the intention of concentrating at
Lafayette, Ga.
The Trap
is Set
Gen. Braxton Bragg. LOC |
Rather than
fleeing to Atlanta, Bragg was himself concentrating forces near Lafayette, Ga.
Anticipating actions, Bragg had enacted deception operations of his own sending
deserters into Federal ranks with false reports of a disorganized retreat.
Confederate officers primed civilians with tales of an Army on the verge of
ruin with the intention of luring Rosecrans into a false sense of security. Far
from the demoralized army that Rosecrans envisioned, the Army of Tennessee,
swelling in size to 63,000 men, was poised to strike. Knowing that the
mountains west of Lafayette canalized movement to three passes, Bragg ordered his
generals to be prepared to advance upon Federal elements in the vicinity of
McLemore’s Cove.
Marching
into McLemore’s Cove, Soldiers of Thomas’ Corps were confronted by forces of
D.H. Hill’s Corps at Davis’ Crossroads on September 10. Despite outnumbering the
Federals three to one, the Confederates failed to seize the opportunity fearing
that they, themselves, were outnumbered.[5]
Thomas was able to withdraw the bulk of his forces before they could be
destroyed in detail. Meanwhile, to the north near Graysville, Ga., Federal
forces attempting to cross Pea Vine Creek were thwarted by the 6th Georgia Cavalry
supported by Captain Gustave Huwald’s Tennessee Artillery Battery.[6]
After the
abortive attempt by Confederates at Davis’ Crossroads and the actions along Pea
Vine Creek, Rosecrans belatedly realized the peril of his position. He had sent
his army in motion along separate routes of march confident that his enemy was
fleeing. Instead, Bragg was numerically superior, concentrated, and in a
position to seize the initiative. Recognizing the danger Rosecrans resolved to
concentrate his forces along the banks of the Chickamauga River north of Lafayette.
Bragg intended to give him battle before he could concentrate.
Crossing
the Chickamauga
On September
18, 1863, lead elements of the Confederate Army encountered Federal resistance
at Reed’s Bridge, a crossing of the Chickamauga Creek. Federal forces under Col.
Robert Minty attempted to burn the bridge but were compelled to withdraw by
Confederate pressure. Among the units present at Reeds Bridge was the 1st
Georgia Cavalry.[7]
Meanwhile to
the south at Alexander’s Bridge, Federal Col. John Wilder’s brigade defended
the river crossing with seven-shot Spencer Carbines. These weapons allowed
Wilder’s Brigade to summon the firepower of two divisions worth of firepower.
While Wilder was able to hold his position, Confederates secured a bridgehead
across the Chickamauga at Reed’s Bridge. Unable to drive Wilder’s men from the north
side of Alexander’s Bridge, Confederates managed to cross the stream nearby at
Lambert’s and Bedford’s Ford.
The site of Alexander's Bridge in 2018. Photo by Maj. William Carraway |
On the morning of September 19, Federal and Confederate forces faced each other in a line running roughly north to south with the Federals arrayed on the west side of the Lafayette Road. General Bragg was resolved to cut off Federal avenues of retreat while Rosecrans’ intent was to hold the Lafayette Road line to prevent the destruction of his forces. Rosecrans was committed to fighting a defensive battle. The initiative thus shifted to Bragg.
[1] Street,
James. The Struggle for Tennessee: Tupelo to Stones River. Alexandria,
VA: Time-Life Books, 1990., 59.
[2] Powell,
David A., and David A. Friedrichs. The Maps of Chickamauga: An Atlas of the
Chickamauga Campaign, including the Tullahoma Operations, June 22 - September
23, 1863. New York: Savas Beatie, 2009. 16
[3]Cozzens,
Peter. This Terrible Sound: The Battle of Chickamauga. Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1996, 48.
[4] Cozzens,
60.
[5] Powell,
28.
[6] Powell,
27
[7] Powell,
46
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